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"There is a Feeling that your Culture is Worth Less" – A Comparison of British and Croatian Students' Attitudes towards Globalisation

Marin Cvitanović (Bournemouth), Jelena Lončar,
and Zdenko Braičić (both Zagreb)*

with 6 figures in the text

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*   Dr. Marin Cvitanović (corresponding author), Principal Academic in Human Geography, Bournemouth University, Fern Barrow Poole BH12 5BB, Bournemouth, United Kingdom; Dr. Jelena Lončar, Associate Professor, University of Zagreb, Faculty of Science, Marulićev trg 19/II, Zagreb, Croatia; Zdenko Braičić, Associate Professor, University of Zagreb, Faculty of Teacher Education, Savska cesta 77, Zagreb, Croatia. – Emails: mcvitanovic@bournemouth.ac.uk; jloncar@geog.pmf.hr; zdenko.braicic@ufzg.hr.

Summary

A recent rise in Euro-scepticism in the European Union can be linked to its unequal economic development as a consequence of globalisation. It has manifested itself in increasing support for radical right-wing parties, which is partly based on anti-globalist sentiments. One of the major expressions of this anti-globalist and Eurosceptic views has been "Brexit", the UK's withdrawal from the EU in 2020. Seven years before Brexit, another European country, Croatia, joined the EU. The main aim of this paper is to understand how attitudes towards globalisation differ between UK and Croatian students by analysing and comparing the students' values, beliefs and perceptions regarding globalisation generally and EU integration more specifically.

　　The study was conducted in 2019–2020 and consisted of a questionnaire survey on a sample of n=283 geography students (154 in Croatia and 129 in the UK). The results demonstrate that both Croatian and UK students tend to see globalisation as a positive process (57.6 %) with the largest benefits being an increase in exchange of knowledge and scientific advancements, and growth of economy. While both cohorts agree that the main negative consequences globally are increased economic inequalities and exploitation of workers, several differences in perception of negative consequences of globalisation in their respective countries are also identified.

Keywords: Globalisation; survey; attitudes; students; United Kingdom; Croatia

Zusammenfassung

„Man hat das Gefühl, dass die eigene Kultur weniger Wert ist." – Ein Vergleich der Einstellungen britischer und kroatischer Studierender zur Globalisierung

Die jüngste Zunahme der Euroskepsis in der Europäischen Union kann mit der ungleichen wirtschaftlichen Entwicklung infolge der Globalisierung in Verbindung gebracht werden. Sie hat sich in einer zunehmenden Unterstützung für rechtsradikale Parteien manifestiert, die teilweise auf antiglobalistischen Gefühlen beruht. Eine der wichtigsten Ausdrucksformen dieser antiglobalistischen und euroskeptischen Ansichten war der „Brexit", der Austritt des Vereinigten Königreichs aus der Europäischen Union im Jahr 2020. Sieben Jahre vor dem Brexit trat ein anderes europäisches Land, Kroatien, der EU bei. Das Hauptziel dieses Beitrags ist es, zu verstehen, wie sich die Einstellungen zur Globalisierung zwischen britischen und kroatischen Studierenden unterscheiden, indem die Werte, Überzeugungen und Wahrnehmungen der Studentinnen und Studenten in Bezug auf die Globalisierung im Allgemeinen und die EU-Integration im Besonderen analysiert und verglichen werden.

　　Die vorliegende Studie wurde in den Jahren 2019–2020 durchgeführt und bestand aus einer Fragebogenerhebung bei einer Stichprobe von n=283 Studierenden des Faches Geographie (154 in Kroatien und 129 im Vereinigten Königreich). Die Ergebnisse zeigen, dass sowohl kroatische als auch britische Studierende dazu neigen, die Globalisierung als einen positiven Prozess zu sehen (57,6 %), wobei die größten Vorteile in der Zunahme des Wissensaustauschs und des wissenschaftlichen Fortschritts sowie im Wachstum der Wirt-

schaft liegen. Während beide Kohorten darin übereinstimmen, dass die wichtigsten negativen Folgen der Globalisierung die zunehmende wirtschaftliche Ungleichheit und die Ausbeutung von Arbeitnehmern sind, wurden auch einige Unterschiede in der Wahrnehmung der negativen Folgen der Globalisierung in ihren jeweiligen Ländern festgestellt.

Schlagwörter: Globalisierung; Umfrage; empirische Erhebung, Einstellungen; Studierende; Vereinigtes Königreich; Kroatien

1 Introduction

Globalisation is a complex concept which has been in the fore of economic and social scientific research since at least the 1980s (KALUĐEROVIĆ 2008; JAMES and STEGER 2014). While it is difficult to create a single overarching theory of globalisation (JACKSON 2016), in its most simple terms it can be defined as a process of increased interaction and integration of individuals and organisations from different nations (CHIU et al. 2011). Globalisation includes flows of goods, services, ideas, technologies, cultures and peoples across regions and continents, and as such represents a change in the way space, economy and society interact (HELD et al. 2000; DANIELS et al. 2001; CHIU and KWAN 2016). Conceptualisations of globalisation have typically highlighted interrelated socio-cultural, political-economic, and technological aspects of these processes, with different researchers emphasising and framing the relationships among these aspects in diverse ways (JACKSON 2016; CALLAGHAN 2021).

Globalisation is also a spatially and socially uneven process, affecting different regions and groups in specific way (HAYS et al. 2019; MAY et al. 2021). This is not a new idea, and it has been examined in the past, mostly from an economic perspective. Claims that international economic ties contribute to uneven development which can lead to social tension have already been made over 40 years ago (SUNKEL and GIRVAN 1973). More recent research focusing on the EU has also predominantly discussed the economic aspect of globalisation and unequal economic development it is facilitating. These analyses include issues of free trade arrangements and globalisation pressures (LISSOWSKA 2002), relationship between de-industrialisation and economic decline (HAYS et al. 2019; CALLAGHAN 2021), import shocks and austere working conditions (COLANTONE and STANIG 2018) or migration of workers from poorer to rich countries (MAY et al. 2021; ARNORSSON and ZOEGA 2018), to name a few. The results have shown that certain groups and regions in the EU have benefited economically from processes that can be linked to globalisation, while others are lagging in development, creating a sort of "winners" and "losers" of the globalisation process in Europe (HAYS et al. 2019; LECHLER 2019; VAN ELSAS 2017; SASSEN 2010).

HAYS et al. (2019) show that exposure to import shocks linked to economic globalisation in the EU can also be associated with increasing support for radical right-wing parties, which is partly based on anti-globalist sentiments. This is in a way a "switch" in attitudes towards economic globalisation which has happened since the turn of the Millennium. Previously, economic globalisation was seen as benefiting the Global North

but more recently, a backlash against economic globalisation has emerged in the Global North, with the support from the political right (Callaghan 2021; Brack and Startin 2015). However, it seems that this anti-globalism and Euro-scepticism goes beyond the issues of economic insecurity and is expressed through anti-immigration views and opposition to multicultural integration as well (Corbet and Larkin 2019; Lechler 2019; Jolly and DiGiusto 2014). The support seems to be the highest in regions which were exposed to stronger import shocks (resulting in e.g., job losses and austere working conditions), but studies have shown that the voting patterns in these regions are affected not only by voters' economic disadvantages, but also by their lower level of education, race and more pronounced fear of immigration and multiculturalism (Rodríguez-Aguilera de Prat 2012; Colantone and Stanig 2018).

This interconnectedness of spatial, economic, and social factors affecting attitudes and beliefs towards globalisation and its consequences is especially interesting considering more recent changes on the political map of EU, with Croatia becoming the last country so far to join the Union in 2013, and the UK becoming the first country in history to leave the Union in 2020. Existing research on attitudes of Croatian citizens towards EU or globalisation processes is generally scarce, with inconclusive results. Međan (2019) focused on the student population in Croatia and discovered that students have generally low levels of knowledge about the EU. Research in Eastern Croatia has shown that migrant workers are seen as a cultural threat, and asylum seekers as a safety concern (Gregurović et al. 2016), while a survey conducted on 369 students at the Zagreb school of business shows that the EU is seen as bringing more economic cost than benefits to Croatia (Kurečić et al. 2014). On the other hand, research by Pilić et al. (2009) showed high levels of support to EU accession in southern Croatia, and Mesić and Bagić (2011) identified lower levels of resistance to multi-culturalism in Croatia compared to EU average.

In comparison, research on Brexit has been extensive. The analyses have highlighted different variables affecting the voting pattern in the referendum, such as trust in politicians and ideas about European identity (Dennison et al. 2020), loss of sovereignty (May et al. 2021), the role of media (Breeze 2018) or (perceived) economic disadvantages (Doebler et al. 2017; Pettifor 2017), often highlighting negative attitudes towards immigration, especially from Eastern Europe (Swales 2016; Becker et al. 2017; Arnorsson and Zoega 2018). One thing both countries have in common, and that is that in Brexit the lowest turnout was in the youngest category (Skinner and Gottfried 2016) and in case of Croatia's EU accession the overall turnout was very low (below 50 %) with no data on age categories available (Grubiša 2012). However, anecdotal evidence points to low election turnout in younger population, especially in case of EU elections. Similar patterns of general euro-scepticism or lower turnout in younger cohorts can be seen in other countries (Franklin 2004; Fieldhouse et al. 2007; Butt and Curtice 2010; Brack and Startin 2015; Rodríguez-Aguilera de Prat 2012).

All this raises a question about the future globalisation processes in Europe and the variables affecting them. With rates of industrialisation slowing down, Ozturk and Cavusgil (2019) bring into question whether globalisation as such is actually coming to an end. From an economic perspective, more isolationist and protectionist policies opposing globalisation could have negative economic consequences (Sinkovics et al. 2018), but

from a social and cultural perspective the resistance to multi-culturalism and perceived cultural threats could lead to rise in ethnic tensions and exclusion, xenophobia, and violence (Oliver and Wong 2003; Jolly and DiGiusto 2014).

To add to the existing body of research on (anti)globalisation and Euro-scepticism, in this paper we decided to focus on two countries from the Global North, one which recently joined the EU (Croatia), and the one which recently left it (UK). The main aim is to understand how attitudes towards globalisation differ between UK and Croatian students by analysing and comparing the students' values, beliefs and perceptions regarding globalisation generally and EU integration more specifically. While both countries are considered high income countries (World Bank 2021), major differences between the countries exist, which could provide us with valuable insights in how these differences affect individual's perception of globalisation. Following on previous research, we are interested to see what the perceived positive and negative aspects of globalisation are, as well as who are the perceived winners and losers in the globalisation process, in order to try and understand how the globalisation process might manifest itself in the future. A part of the research will also focus specifically on attitudes towards immigration and anti-globalisation, and the results are discussed in the light of identified cultural, economic and political differences between the countries of the respondents.

2 Methods

This research was based on a questionnaire survey aimed at geography students in the UK and Croatia. Questionnaires were distributed to the sample of students in person (at the University of Zagreb in November 2019) and online (in UK in between November 2019 and May 2020). In total 283 undergraduate and master students took part in the questionnaire, 154 in Croatia and 129 in the UK. Zagreb is one of two universities in Croatia where one can study geography, while UK respondents were from several universities in England (79 %), Wales (12 %) and Scotland (9 %).

The survey used a non-probabilistic sampling method, focusing on a student population of a particular subject. Authors' main area of focus was to understand how the difference in the country of origin and the cultural and economic factors relating to it could play a role in attitudes towards globalisation, which was shown to play a role in a paper by O'Rourke (2003) and Hildebrand and Umeda (2005). Furthermore, previous research focusing on students' perceptions towards globalisation has demonstrated that the study subject can affect opinions towards globalisation, e.g., with more favourable attitudes that are found in business majors (Janavaras et al. 2008; Walker et al. 2011). We wanted to exclude the variables of level and field of education as much as possible, therefore we focused on students of a single subject (in this case geography). By focusing on a student population, the age variable was also excluded from the analysis.

The questionnaire itself consisted of 31 questions, 16 of which were on a Likert-type scale, measuring students' attitudes and beliefs. The main goal was to gauge opinions on several dimensions of globalisation, such as economic consequences of globalisation (Hunt 2003; Hays et al. 2019; Callaghan 2021), international politics (Hogl 2000;

Martens et al. 2010), immigration (Swales 2016; Corbet and Larkin 2019; May et al. 2021), but also on beliefs and attitudes towards anti-globalisation movements (Dilger 2022), and "winners" or benefactors and "losers" or those who do not get much of globalisation process (Sassen 2010; van Elsas 2017; Lechler 2019). These dimensions were identified through extensive literature research to ensure content-based validity, and a mixture of positively and negatively worded questions was used to try and minimise the danger of acquiescent response bias (Rattray and Jones 2007). Subsequently, each dimension was narrowed into a single, measurable construct and was examined through different types of questions as previously described. Out of three components of attitudes (Hogg and Vaughan 2005), this research focused mostly on the cognitive and the affective component, while the behavioural component was included through the question about willingness to join an anti-globalisation movement.

Answers to open-ended questions were grouped into categories based on the keywords and topics emerging from the answers, and the responses from closed questions were subjected to statistical tests using IBM SPSS 26 software. The tests included chi-square in case of categorical variables (e.g., when checking if there was a relationship between country of origin of respondents and the expression of their (supra)national identity), or Mann-Whitney U test when comparing UK and Croatian students' attitudes and opinions where responses were on a Likert scale. There was no assumption of normal distribution of our variables, and the statistical significance level was set at $p < 0.05$. The descriptive statistics were expressed through numbers (n) and frequency (%) of responses.

3 Results

3.1 Respondent Data

The median age of students in this survey was 21 for Croatia and 22 for the UK. In terms of gender, 50.5 percent were female, 49.5 percent were male and 0.5 percent expressed other gender identities. When asked if they consider themselves as citizens of Croatia/UK, Europe, World or something else, there was a statistically significant difference in expression of one's identity between UK and Croatian students ($\chi^2 = 53.33$, df = 3, p < 0.01). While 63.8 percent of UK students included some supra-national elements in their identity (e.g., EU, Europe, the World), only 46 percent of Croatian students did the same.

There is also a statistical difference between the reported main drivers of globalisation processes in the world between the two cohorts ($\chi^2 = 45.87$, df = 3, p < 0.01). While the majority of UK students believe that the strongest driver behind globalisation are economic interests (62 %) followed by the media and internet (34.3 %), Croatian students believe it's media and social media (72.2 %) which drives globalisation. Following on the importance of media, both groups showed similar patterns in how often they follow the news. National news is followed more than international news with around 86 percent of UK students following local and national news every day or several times a week, and 77.4 percent of Croatian students doing the same. In case of international news, they are followed much less than local and national news – 50 percent of UK students follow them

every day or several times a week, while 43 percent of Croatian students do the same, with no statistical differences between groups.

Both the Croatian and the UK respondents perceive their respective countries and themselves as individuals as under a strong influence of globalisation. Around 90 percent of Croatian and 85.3 percent of UK students agree that globalisation has a visible effect on their lives, with no statistical difference between groups. The same goes for the respondents' respective countries – around 91.2 percent of UK students and 93.5 percent of Croatian students agree or strongly agree that they live in a globalised country. In addition, only 16.7 percent of UK students believe that their country is "too globalised" (with 5.2 % undecided), while 15.8 percent of Croatian students think the same (with 9.2 % undecided), with no statistical difference between the groups.

3.2   Origins and Spread of Globalisation

There was a statistically significant difference between the students' perception of the beginnings of globalisation processes in the world (Mann-Whitney U = 3479, p < 0.01). While 57.8 percent of the UK students believe that the process of globalisation has been going on for a long time (e.g., since the Colombian exchange or the colonial era) 73.1 percent of Croatian students see it as a recent process characteristic for the 20th and 21st century. Looking into the future, the minority (21.6 %) of UK students agree that globalisation has reached its peak in the UK (with 55 % disagreeing), while 24.1 percent of Croatian students agree that globalisation has reached its peak in most globalised countries in the world (with 64.8 % disagreeing). Croatian students are also more favourable towards their country having a larger influence on a global level, compared to their UK peers. While 54 percent of the UK students agree that their country should play a more important role in global economic and political affairs, for Croatian students the level of agreement is 84.3 percent (Mann Whitney U = 7994, p < 0.01).

The students expressed statistically different opinions on their country's EU (dis)integration processes, with Brexit for UK seen as less important in terms of globalisation process than EU joining for Croatia. While 62 percent of UK students believe that Brexit has or will affect the globalisation process of their country, 96.3 percent of Croatian students believe that joining the EU had an effect of the globalisation process in Croatia (Mann Whitney U = 2786.5, p < 0.01). In the UK, 21.6 percent of respondents remained undecided.

3.3   Attitudes towards Globalisation

One of the main questions in the survey referred to the perception of globalisation as a generally positive or a negative process. There was no statistical difference between UK and Croatian students' perception of globalisation, with around 59 percent of Croatian and 56 percent of UK students agreeing that globalisation is a generally positive process. The same number of students in both countries is undecided about this statement (33 %), with a low percentage of students who see it as a mostly negative process.

Globalisation is generally seen as very important for both economic and societal development of a country, but slightly more important for economic development. There were no statistical differences between the groups – while 87 percent of UK students believe that globalisation is key for economic development, 83.4 percent of Croatian students believe the same. The percentages are lower for societal development, where 74.5 percent of UK students and 74 percent of Croatian students believe that globalisation is key in societal development of a country.

More Croatian students believe that globalisation can reduce economic differences in the world, compared to their UK peers (Mann Whitney U = 4682, p < 0.05). While 38.2 percent of UK students mostly agree or agree with this statement, 37.3 percent mostly disagree or disagree with 24.5 percent undecided. In Croatia, more students agree with this statement (48.2 %) and fewer students disagree (20.4 %), but there are also more undecided students (31.4 %).

In case of the societal differences, there were no statistically significant differences in responses between the groups. In the UK 34.3 percent of students agree that globalisation can reduce societal differences in the world, while 36.3 percent disagreed with 29.4 percent undecided. In Croatia 51 percent agreed with the same statement, while 22.2 percent disagreed with 26.8 percent undecided. Generally, both groups expressed much higher agreement with the importance of globalisation for overall societal and economic *development*, rather than its importance in reducing societal and economic *differences*.

One of the questions was concerned with the opinion on anti-globalisation movements and the willingness of participants to join them. There was a statistically significant difference between UK and Croatian students' opinion on anti-globalisation movements (χ^2 = 49.05, df = 4, p < 0.01). While 60.2 percent of Croatian students believe that anti-globalisation movements are legitimate and reasonable, only 38.3 percent of UK students believe the same. There was also a statistically significant difference in willingness to join an anti-globalisation movement (χ^2 = 9.314, df = 4, p < 0.05) even if the overall level of support for such movements is low. Only 1.9 percent of UK students and 4.6 percent of Croatian students would consider joining such a movement, while 66.9 percent of UK students (31.2 % undecided) and 49.1 percent of Croatian students (46.3 % undecided) wouldn't join one.

3.4   Positive and Negative Effects of Globalisation

When asked what the positive effects of globalisation in the world are, Croatian and UK students expressed very similar opinions. Most common answers included were: Easier product availability; Greater mobility of people and goods; Connectivity and accessibility; Cultural and ideological exchange; Greater availability of markets and information; Spreading ideas; Internet; Social progress; A chance to progress; Exchange of knowledge and information; Cultural contacts; Development of medicine, science and society in general; Economic development in general; Connectivity at all levels. The answers were grouped into three main categories as seen in Figure 1.

Both respondent groups agree that the exchange of knowledge and economic growth are the most important aspects of globalisation, with Croatian students putting more em-

phasis on knowledge exchange (49.1 %) than the British (31.1 %). Furthermore, UK students consider the growth of cultural diversity and multiculturalism more important (13.9 %) than their Croatian counterparts (6.4 %).


Source: Own survey 2019–2020; own design

Figure 1: Most often mentioned positive effects of globalisation in the world for Croatian and UK geography students

In the case of negative consequences of globalisation worldwide, most common answers included: Unequal development; Too much political influence of superpowers; Increasing gap between regions; Imperialism and neo-colonialism; Consumerism; Violent spread of democracy and capitalism in developing countries; Destruction of local producers and local crafts; Monopoly of developed countries; Terrorism; Unfair distribution of capital; The collapse of the traditional structure of society; McDonaldisation of society; to name a few. When grouped into thematically coherent categories (Figure 2), again the two most often mentioned answers were the same for both groups. However, UK students put a much stronger emphasis on the growth of economic inequalities and exploitation of workers (50.9 %) than the Croatian students (27.6 %). On the other hand, Croatian students put more emphasis on the loss of cultural and national identity (26.7 %) compared to UK students (18.9 %). Furthermore, for Croatian students the loss of sovereignty of smaller, less developed countries is seen as relatively important (12.4 %), while environmental degradation is more important for UK students (17.9 %).

There were noted similarities in how both UK and Croatian students see the positives of globalisation processes in their respective countries (Figure 3). Both groups consider economic growth as the most important aspect of globalisation in their countries. However, as the second most important positive process, UK students have identified the growth of cultural diversity and immigration (23.7 %), while their Croatian peers see political

Source: Own survey 2019–2020; own design

Figure 2: Most often mentioned negarive effects of globalisation in the world for Croatian and UK geography students


Source: Own survey 2019–2020; own design

Figure 3: Most often mentioned positive effects of globalisation in their respective countries for Croatian and UK geography students

and economic integration and cooperation as the second-most important positive aspect of globalisation in Croatia (21.6 %), with very little mention of benefits of multiculturalism.

The largest difference between UK and Croatian students can be seen in the perception of negative effects of globalisation in their respective countries (Figure 4). For Croatian students' loss of sovereignty (24.4 %) and loss of local and national culture (21.6 %) are seen as most important negative aspects of globalisation in Croatia, while the UK students identify growth of inequalities and exploitation of workers (20.4 %) and small business suffering (17.1 %) as the most important negative aspects of globalisation in their country.


Source: Own survey 2019–2020; own design

Figure 4: Most often mentioned negative effects of globalisation in their respective countries for Croatian and UK geography students

3.5 "Winners" and "Losers" of the Globalisation Processes

Both the Croatian and the UK students see large economies and wealthy countries as well as TNC's and big businesses as the biggest winners of the globalisation processes worldwide. However, while Croatian students put more emphasis on large countries and wealthy economies (60.7 % compared to 34.3 % for UK students), for UK students TNCs and big businesses are almost equally important (Figure 5). As globalisation "winners" students point out: Global North; Great world powers and humanity in general; Social network influencers; G7 group; EU, China, USA, Japan; Bankers; Countries that are growing and adapting; Corporations; Former colonial powers; The elites and media; Business

people and professionals as well as politicians; People in the education system, innovative and creative people; International organisations; Neoliberal market; Neo-communists and neoliberal capitalists; Transnational social sphere; There's none. The answers have been coded into three coherent categories.


Source: Own survey 2019–2020; own design

Figure 5: Most often mentioned "winners" of globalisation in the world for Croatian and UK geography students

Regarding the "losers" of globalisation, there are a few differences between the groups of respondents. While both groups agree that poor countries most often are at the receiving end of negative aspects of globalisation, for Croatian students' small countries are also recognised as being disadvantaged by these processes (16.5 %), while UK students identify poor people (24.3 %) as losers in the globalisation processes. Most common answers included: Global South; Underdeveloped countries that depend on the export of only one or a few products; Countries of Africa, Latin America and poor countries of Asia; Undeveloped countries that cannot resist the influence of stronger nations; Countries of no importance on the world stage; To some extent poorer EU countries; States without political influence; Unstable countries; National cultures; Small nations and the environment; Minority cultures and traditional values; Environment; Traditional values; Non-engaged individuals; Population in underdeveloped parts of the world; Poor communities in general; Welfare state system; Nationalists; Middle class; Countries that are not competitive in the market; Bureaucracy; Nature; There's none. The answers have been coded into three coherent categories (Figure 6).

At the end of the questionnaire, students were free to share their opinions about what they believe globalisation will bring in the future. The students pointed out the following:

Source: Own survey 2019–2020; own design

Figure 6: Most often mentioned "losers" of globalisation in the world for Croatian and UK geography students

Development of one global culture and economy; Growth of social networks; Development of underdeveloped countries and stagnation of developed countries; Even greater growth of the G7 and their control of the global; Even greater strengthening of the economies of the strongest countries; Further enrichment of the rich; Greater standardisation of culture and an increasing economic gap; Further destabilisation of societies as well as growing awareness of the impact of the human species on the environment; Suppression of traditional values; Further exploitation of natural resources; Further widening of the gap between countries; Reducing economic differences; Development of new industries; Stronger [transnational] financial flows; Establishing cooperation between countries; Increasing integration between countries; Further ICT development; Declining quality of life; Exploring the unexplored (space); China as a leader; Expansion of education, communications and transport possibilities; Mass migrations; Abolition of states; Modern technology expansion and advancement; Further relocation of low-productivity activities to underdeveloped countries.

4 Discussion and Conclusions

The results in this research have demonstrated that both UK and Croatian students generally perceive themselves as under strong influence of globalisation as individuals (87.7 % overall), as well as living in highly globalised countries (92.4 % overall). They tend to describe globalisation as a positive process (57.6 %, with a third of respondents being

undecided) driven mostly by economic interests and (social) media. In terms of their own sources of information, around 81 percent of the respondents read, watch or listen to local and national news at least several times a week. This percentage drops to 46 percent when only international news is considered. These results are very similar to other research about globalisation in EU and USA, where general support for globalisation processes tends to be between 40 and 60 percent (Eurobarometer 2017; Chicago Council Survey 2021) but with a recent significant drop during the Covid-19 pandemic (Boyon 2021). The frequency of national and international news consumption is also similar to other research in Croatia, UK and USA (Ofcom News Consumption Report 2020; Ipsos Connect 2019; Knight Foundation 2018).

However, there are some notable differences between the respondent groups. While Croatian students perceive globalisation as a fairly recent process characteristic for the 20th and 21st century (73.1 %), the majority of UK students (57.8 %) see it as a process that has been going on for much longer. Following Rantanen's (2005) claim that globalisation started at different times in different parts of the world, the results of this research suggest that historic development of Croatia and UK have affected the way origins of globalisation are perceived in these countries. UK was a relevant colonial power for several centuries, which resulted in massive demographic changes in the country. During the decolonisation process in the 20th century, at least five to seven post-colonial million immigrants came to Europe, settling mostly in UK, France, Portugal and the Netherlands, where they now comprise a significant minority (Gunew 1998; Bosma 2012).

Unlike the UK, Croatia throughout its recent history was a part of the Habsburg Monarchy (since the 16th century) and Yugoslavia (most of the 20th century); it was never a colonial power, nor did it witness a significant influx of people from other countries or continents. As a result, the latest UK census shows a much more ethnically diverse society compared to Croatia. For example, in the UK 14 percent of the population belong to non-white ethnic groups, and the same proportion of the population was not born in the UK. At the same time the category of race doesn't even exist in the Croatian census, as the number of people not belonging to the "White European" category is negligible. Furthermore, less than 1 percent of Croatian residents are non-Croatian citizens, and the percentage of the population identifying as ethnic Croats is 90.5 percent (the largest minority are Serbs which comprise 4.36 % of the population). Or as Bhambra and Narayan (2017) stated – European states have been multicultural for as long as they have been imperial.

This cultural diversity (or the lack of it) is facilitated by globalisation, internationalisation and growing mobility of groups of people. It is not reflected only in the population characteristics of the studied countries, but in the perception and knowledge of multiculturalism as well (Castles 1997; Ivenicki 2020). The focus here is not the existence of cultural diversity per se, but the societal reaction to it. The results from our survey demonstrate that the UK respondents, coming from a more multi-cultural society, tended to recognise cultural diversity and immigration as a positive aspect of globalisation in their countries (23 %) much more than their Croatian counterparts (3 %). Most research generally states that exposure to multiculturalism is positive and tends to lead to a reduction in bias and cultural stereotypes (Tadmor et al. 2012; Oliver and Wong 2003), which is in accordance with our results. The available literature also points to the importance of

individual traits. For example, a person's cognitive flexibility and openness to new experiences play an important role in how multiculturalism is perceived, as do their previous personal experiences with multiculturalism (Chao et al. 2015; Maddux et al. 2021). Individuals with a strong cultural identification tend to reject foreign cultures more often and show more prejudice, as groups with different cultural values are seen as competitors for resources (Chao et al. 2015; Morrison et al. 2010).

Apart from lesser exposure to multiculturalism in Croatia, the results from this survey suggest that cultural identification indeed might play a role in how multiculturalism is perceived, with respondents from Croatia assumed to be showing on average stronger cultural identification than the UK students. This can be seen in differences in expressing their own cultural identity where Croatian students expressed their belonging to a supra-national identity less often (46 %) than their UK counterparts (63.8 %), while also highlighting cultural erosion and the loss of cultural identity as negative aspects of globalisation more often than their UK counterparts.

Similar to colonial history in the case of the UK, the stronger cultural identification of Croatian respondents can be linked to (more recent) historical events and processes. Croatia emerged on the international political map only after the dissolution of Yugoslavia in 1990s. The process of nation-building in the country coincided with a war led by nationalist rulers and was fuelled by ethno-mobilisation consisting of e.g., altering history books in schools, changing street names and using sports in the formation and conservation of the emerging national identity and culture (Brentin 2013; Petricusic 2008; Šakaja and Stanić 2011). Creating and maintaining national myths was an efficient tool for political mobilisation (Vangeli 2011), but its effects were not limited to politics. This resulted in a deep cultural identification in Croatian society, largely linked to the war and the political and economic turmoil of the 1990s (Goulding and Domic 2009). Additionally, a study by Lončar (2017) pointed out that young people in Croatia on average possess limited knowledge of human rights, of cultural differences, and of politics and political processes in general. They have a limited sense of importance of public activism and their attitudes in places reveal tendencies towards undemocratic viewpoints and values, willingness for discrimination, exclusiveness, censorship and the use of violence.

It will be interesting to see how the Brexit will affect cultural identification of the UK population in the future, as some of the narratives used in political mobilisation of the pro-Brexit vote were not too different from the narratives and myths used in nationalistic political mobilisation in Eastern Europe in 1990s. E.g., there was a noted rise in nationalistic and nativistic views in the UK during the Brexit campaign (Amadi 2020) with emerging topics such as regaining control of own resources and borders (Agnisola et al. 2019; Pitcher 2019), invoking the "glorious past" and being envied by others (UKIP Manifesto 2015) and hegemonic identifications of "us" versus "them" (Breeze 2018), to name a few. At the moment, over 60 percent of the UK respondents in this survey believe that Brexit will affect globalisation processes in the UK.

Results from this research also point to the importance of the size of the country and its economy in the perception of advantages and disadvantages of globalisation. Croatian students identified loss of sovereignty (24.4 %) and cultural erosion (21.6 %) as the two most negative aspects of globalisation in their country, while for UK students it was growth of

inequalities and small business suffering, with very little mention of loss of sovereignty (2.8 %). Croatian students also more frequently identified small countries as the "losers" of globalisation and large economies and wealthy countries as the "winners" in the globalisation process in the world compared to their UK peers.

Previous research on this topic did identify certain disadvantages of small countries in globalisation processes, such as pressures from larger industrialised countries and international financial institutions on how to manage their economies (Rampersad 2000), the case of smaller domestic markets with smaller demand for domestic products which affects economic development of the country (Nenovski and Smilkovski 2012), the inability to affect prices on the global market (Kenc and Sayan 2001) or country's increased economic vulnerability in global tariff wars (Lashkaripour 2021). With a population of less than 4 million, Croatia can be considered a small country and the results of this research show that Croatian students perceive their country as being more disadvantaged in globalisation processes compared to larger, richer countries such as the UK. This perception of being disadvantaged could also be linked to the desire of Croatian students for their country to have a larger influence on a global level (84.3 % for Croatian, only 54 % of UK), potentially to counter the perceived negative disadvantages and the lack of influence or sovereignty in decision making.

These disadvantages are often approached from an economic perspective, but they are inevitably intertwined with political and cultural aspects of the globalisation processes. Most controversies arise regarding the influx of Western mass culture and subsequent cultural homogenisation and Westernisation facilitated by the spread of global capitalism (Appadurai 1990; Yin and Qian 2020; Ok Kim 2010; Marin 2008). The exchange of cultural ideas between countries can be seen as multidirectional, but still unequal as the implications of power relations between the nation states and exporting culture favour those on the more powerful side, with elements of local traditions, knowledges and experiences in "recipient" countries sometimes changed or lost (Curran and Park 2000; Ok Kim 2010; Sujarwo et al. 2014; Magu 2015). As Hall (1997, p. 3) stated, the dominant strain of global mass culture *"remains centered in the West […] and it always speaks English"* (in Curran and Park 2000).

In this narrative the UK is firmly rooted in the West, with Croatia less so. The responses from Croatian students demonstrate that their perception of globalisation is that, amongst other things, it imposes cultural uniformity and causes cultural erosion, at least in smaller countries such as Croatia. Responses to open-ended questions in our survey point in this direction as well, where statements by Croatian students such as "there is too strong influence from bigger countries", "we will all look and talk the same – in English" or "Croatia as a small country is not important in global decision making" and "There is a feeling that your culture is worth less" were not uncommon. Words such as "Americanisation", "Westernisation" and "McDonaldisation" when describing globalisation processes in Croatia were also used several times.

This could again in part be linked to previously mentioned topics such as strong cultural identification in Croatia, or comparatively less experience with multiculturalism. Other research on student population in Croatia has also identified high levels of agreement with statements that globalisation means losing the country's sovereignty and your own cul-

tural identity (Korenčić Kampl and Šajković 2002), and the research by Opačić (2007) identified "uncontrolled" penetration of English words into Croatian language. Perhaps this is the reason why the support for anti-globalisation processes in this research is higher in Croatia than in the UK, despite being very small overall.

Regardless of differences in opinion on what the most negative effect of globalisation in their respective countries is, Croatian and UK students agree on what the most negative effect of globalisation in the world is – the rise of economic inequalities and exploitation of workers. This is one of the main outcomes of this survey. In addition to the already mentioned global economic inequalities, poor countries are most often mentioned as "losers" of globalisation in the world for both cohorts, while UK respondents also highlight economic inequalities as an important negative effect of globalisation in their country. Furthermore, both groups of students mention large economies and wealthy countries, TNCs and big businesses and the rich elites as the biggest "winners" of globalisation processes in the world. At first glance, this is different from general findings in existing literature, as global income inequality in the world has been declining for several decades (Rougoor and van Marrewijk 2015).

However, more thorough analyses show that this noted decrease in the global income gap is partly due to economic growth in China and Southeast Asia, and, more importantly, that this decrease in between-country inequality is possibly a result of an increase of within-country inequality, where the income increase is registered within the richest quintile, while the income of the poorest groups is left unchanged (Sala-I-Martin 2006). Even in the case of China, research has demonstrated that, despite narrowing the distance in economic development with more developed countries, the gap between rich, coastal areas of China and the poorer interior has increased 10 times, meaning that many groups of people were excluded from the potential benefits of globalisation (Zeng and Zhao 2010; Fujita and Hu 2001).

Other research has also demonstrated an increase of regional disparities within countries (see Ezcurra and Rodríguez-Posse (2013) for a comprehensive overview), while a model developed by Fukiharu (2013) showed that tendencies for increased inequalities in income distribution during globalisation processes do exist and are particularly strong in smaller countries. As Castles (2011, p. 311) described it – *"a cosmopolitan, mobile world for elites; a world of barriers, exploitation, and security controls for the rest"*. The results from this research also point to the differences between overall development on one side and interregional disparities on the other, as both groups of respondents believe globalisation is much more important for overall social (74.2 %) and economic (83.8 %) development of a country, compared to its role in reducing social (42.9 %) and economic (43.3 %) differences.

Finally, the results of this research point to the possibility that Croatia, compared to the UK, is indeed more disadvantaged in the globalisation processes (or at least perceived as more disadvantaged), but still there is no difference in perception of globalisation as positive process between the Croatian and the UK participants. The fact that the majority of respondents in our research, regardless of their country of origin, still perceive globalisation as an overall positive process (despite highlighting several of its major disadvantages) could suggest that both groups of respondents still perceive their countries as

the "winners" of globalisation, even if Croatia might be located at a kind of periphery of the winners' circle. Another possibility is that, even if they are aware of negative sides of globalisation, the respondents believe that the negatives are offset by more important positive aspects of globalisation such as exchange of knowledge and scientific advancements, economic growth and international cooperation.

Furthermore, very few respondents believe that the process of globalisation has reached its peak or that it is slowing down. For that particular reason, it is even more important to understand the negative aspects of globalisation in relation to cultural, economic and social differences between countries taking part in this process. This includes issues such as growth of inequalities, exploitation of workers, environmental problems, and the fear of smaller countries losing their identity, culture and sovereignty. These processes can be detrimental to democracy, human rights, and the environment, which further emphasises the importance of these issues in any future discussions and analyses about globalisation. This research could be also seen as a part of advocating global awareness in education among students. Students should be much more exposed to topics like globalisation during their education. The global or geographical knowledge is the foundation on which to build a general human awareness, strengthen cooperation and international understanding (Braičić 2012).

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